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American Bar Association Center on Children and the Law Bar-Youth Empowerment Project White Paper

**A LAWYER FOR EVERY CHILD: CLIENT-DIRECTED REPRESENTATION IN DEPENDENCY CASES**

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The article begins with a due process analysis concluding that children are legally entitled to counsel and continues by presenting examples of federal and state legislation, court decisions, and public policy arguments that support this right. The article then goes a step further to advocate for a traditional, client-directed model of representation, which empowers children and leads to better judicial decision making. Finally, the article discusses the impact of high caseloads and lack of training on attorney performance. This article serves as an important addition to the academic literature examining the need for and role of the child's attorney in dependency proceedings.

**Keywords:** child's attorney; attorney for children; guardian ad litem; client-directed representation; abuse and neglect; dependency; right to counsel

**Editor's Note**

This article was written by LaShanda Taylor, a former staff attorney with the American Bar Association (ABA) Center on Children and the Law. She worked primarily on the Bar-Youth Empowerment Project, a project started by the ABA's Center on Children and the Law and the Commission on Youth at Risk, in partnership with Casey Family Programs and the Eckerd Family Foundation. [FN1]

The Bar-Youth Empowerment Project aims to improve outcomes for youth currently in foster care by promoting youth participation in court cases that affect them and ensuring that all youth have legal representation in their dependency case. In furtherance of its objectives, this article advocates for the appointment of client-directed attorneys for all children in the abuse and neglect system.

While the overall positions presented in this article are consistent with policy resolutions approved formally by the ABA, including those addressing the important role that lawyers for youth play in assuring they receive the services to which they are entitled under law, the views expressed therein are those of the ABA Bar-Youth Empowerment Project and have not *606 been approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the ABA. Nor should this article be construed as representing the policy of the ABA, Casey Family Programs, or the Eckerd Family Foundation.

**I. INTRODUCTION**

By the time a child's case enters the dependency court system, he is alleged to have experienced abuse, neglect, or abandonment by a parent or caregiver on whom he should have been most able to rely. He is removed from all that is familiar to him, including family, home, friends, and school. From the toys he had in his room to his favorite teacher at school, virtually everything to which he has become accustomed is stripped away suddenly and unexpectedly.
The dependency court system was designed to protect the child from future losses and abuse, ensure his safety and well-being, and reunite him with family or find him another permanent place to call home. Yet, when the child’s case is heard he is often without a voice. He has no one advocating for his desires, wishes, or hopes. His views are not considered equal to the views of his parents, caregivers, or the state. In some jurisdictions, his opinion about his life, including where he wants to live, whether he can see his parents and/or siblings, or where he should go to school, are not considered at all.

Because the child often lacks a strong, effective voice in court, the information available to the judge (whose role is to consider all relevant information and make a decision about best interests) is limited and the child is denied a meaningful opportunity to participate in decisions that profoundly affect his life. He is one of society’s most vulnerable members, yet he is rendered speechless and without input into proceedings that determine the course of his life. As one youth said:

You are the one who makes the decisions, [but] I need to be heard so people may understand how I feel or what I need ... Listen to me, since no one else will, and try to understand where I’m coming from. [FN2]

Each year, approximately 300,000 children who have been the victim of child abuse or neglect enter the foster care system. [FN3] Until a safe and stable home can be located, the child is the subject of court proceedings held to determine what is in the child’s best interests. At least every six months, [FN4] the parties to the matter have the opportunity to advocate their positions to a judicial officer. Generally, the state and the parents have attorneys to assist them in this endeavor; however, the child does not. [FN5]

The dependency system should no longer dismiss the voices of those it is charged with protecting. Child clients want to be heard, need to be empowered, and should not be dismissed. [FN6]

II. BACKGROUND

The debate over the appointment of counsel for children usually focuses on two issues: (1) whether children have a need for or right to attorney representation and (2) whether the *607 attorney should serve as a guardian ad litem (GAL) (representing what the lawyer determines to be in the child's best interests) or a client-directed advocate (representing what the child client wants or the child's expressed interests).

While states have been moving toward legal representation as the preferred model, the role played by those lawyers remains a subject of divergence around the nation. Some states provide for a more traditional client-driven model of representation, while other states compel lawyers for children to advocate for the child's best interests, even if at odds with what the youth may want.

This article argues that not only do children need legal representation but that they are legally entitled to it. The article further proposes that the child's attorney must be well trained, unencumbered by high caseloads, and acting within the traditional role as counselor, advisor, and advocate for the child's expressed wishes.

III. CHILDREN HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS

It is well settled that children are afforded protection under the Due Process Clauses of both federal [FN7] and state constitutions. [FN8] These clauses guarantee every person due process of law before any deprivation of life, liberty, or property. To determine whether and to what extent process is due, the court applies a three-part balancing test that weighs the following factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected through the procedures used; (2) the state's interests, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail; and (3) the risk of an erroneous decision if safeguards are not put into place. [FN9]
After performing the balancing test, one must conclude that the enormity of the child's interests involved in abuse and neglect proceedings and the high risk of erroneous deprivation require the appointment of legal representation for children in every case, at every hearing. [FN10]

A. DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS THREATEN A CHILD'S FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTERESTS

A right to counsel is supported by the child's liberty interests at stake in dependency proceedings. These include interests in their own safety, health, and well-being, as well as an interest in maintaining the integrity of the family unit and in having a relationship with biological parents. [FN11] Further, children in state custody may be ordered to reside in a wide array of placements, including those where their physical liberty may be restricted. [FN12]

Throughout a child's time in the dependency system, the court conducts several hearings aimed at determining what is in the child's best interests. These include (1) the initial detention hearing, [FN13] (2) the adjudicatory hearing, [FN14] (3) the dispositional hearing, [FN15] and (4) periodic permanency and review proceedings. [FN16] During dependency proceedings, the court makes decisions regarding issues such as placement, permanency, and visitation. These decisions have an impact on a child's fundamental interests in safety, health, and well-being and on his ability to maintain relationships with his parents and siblings. Relationships with family members are very important to children and any interference with those relationships can be traumatic. [FN17] Once a child is placed in state custody, other liberty interests are at stake due to the “special relationship” created under such circumstances. [FN18]

B. STATES' INTERESTS FAVOR APPOINTING COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN

States have several interests at stake in dependency proceedings, including their interest in maintaining family integrity and obtaining a just and fair resolution. Consistent with their duty to protect children from abuse, [FN19] states also have an interest in ensuring that children are not endangered. When children are determined to be at risk of harm, the state uses its parens patriae authority [FN20] to intervene in the family unit. Once the family dynamic has been disrupted, continued child protection requires a legal process supported by procedures that ensure a fair and inclusive process and maximize the court's fact-finding ability. The state has no interest in intervening in the family when there is not proper justification supported by evidence.

The court is the ultimate arbiter of whether the child is placed in out-of-home care, what permanency plan is in the child's best interests, and how often the child visits his parents and/or siblings. These are decisions that fundamentally alter the direction of the child's future and his familial relationships. Because judges cannot conduct their own investigations, they are entirely dependent on others to provide them with information about the child's circumstances. [FN21] Attorneys not only advocate for their client's position but also present additional facts to the court by filing motions, requesting hearings, and introducing evidence in accordance with applicable rules of procedure. Such advocacy enables each party to have its views, facts, and arguments presented, thereby enabling the court to reach a more informed and accurate decision. Therefore, it is in the state's interest, as well as the child's, to require the appointment of legal representation.

Despite the considerable benefit that attorneys for children provide to the court process and to the child, states may be dissuaded from providing them due to financial concerns. As will be discussed in Part VIII, studies have shown that the cost associated with appointing counsel for children is partially, [FN22] if not wholly, offset by the positive impact that children's attorneys have on the cases and the youth. Even where the entire expenditure is not recuperated, however, the state's fiscal interest against providing counsel is greatly outweighed by the state's other interests and the child's interests in the matter (as discussed above).

C. THE ABSENCE OF ATTORNEYS TO ADVOCATE FOR CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS CREATES A HIGH RISK OF ERRONEOUS DEPRIVATION
The lack of legal advocacy on the child's behalf may result in decisions that keep him in an unsafe environment. The absence of the child's voice means that the court does not have all relevant information to make the best decision. Without attorneys to advocate for the child's expressed interests and present information that would not otherwise be offered, there is a high risk that children will be placed in foster care unnecessarily or will remain in the system longer than required to ensure their safety. In the alternative, it is also possible that, when the child's views and wishes are ignored, he will be returned to an abusive environment. “Attorneys largely control the flow of information to the judge. Attorneys decide what witnesses, evidence, and arguments to present .... Without complete relevant information, judges' decisions may well be ill informed or even tragically mistaken.” [FN23]

Any erroneous decision could have a traumatic, irreversible, and lifelong effect on the child. “On the one hand, an erroneous decision that a child is not deprived or that parental rights should not be terminated can have a devastating effect on a child, leading to chronic abuse or even death. On the other hand, an erroneous decision that a child is deprived or that parental rights should be terminated can lead to the unnecessary destruction of the child's most important family relationships.” [FN24] Due to the impact that an incorrect determination would have on the child, it is critical that judges are presented with all available information.

The presence of an attorney appointed to represent the child substantially decreases the likelihood of error and is therefore integral to the guarantee of due process. One court has found that “only the appointment of counsel can effectively mitigate the risk of significant errors in deprivation and TPR proceedings.” [FN25]

D. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS RECEIVE ATTORNEYS

The failure to provide children with attorneys in abuse and neglect proceedings clearly violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Without lawyers, children are deprived of their fundamental rights without due process of law. The enormity of the child's interests involved in dependency proceedings and the high risk of erroneous deprivation require the appointment of legal representation for children in every case, at every hearing. [FN26] This conclusion is not only consistent with the line of state court decisions upholding a child's constitutional right to counsel (outlined in Part III), but also with the progression of children's rights in the United States.

IV. FEDERAL STATUTES SUPPORT CHILDREN'S RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS

Before 1974, issues related to legal representation for children were focused primarily on delinquency proceedings. [FN27] Widespread attention to child abuse issues, such as “battered child syndrome,” [FN28] led to a focus on child protection. [FN29] In 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), the first comprehensive legislation on child abuse and prevention. [FN30] Among other criteria, CAPTA requires that states provide GALs for all children in child abuse and neglect proceedings. [FN31]

Neither CAPTA nor the implementing regulations provided guidance regarding who should serve as a GAL or the qualifications (including training) and responsibilities of a GAL. [FN32] Each state, therefore, devised a different system of representation based on its interpretation of the GAL provisions. [FN33] By 1980, forty-six states and territories had implemented state laws that at least partially complied with CAPTA. [FN34]

In 1996, CAPTA was reauthorized and amended to provide that a lawyer may be appointed as a GAL. [FN35] The amendment stated that the GAL may “be an attorney or a CASA [Court-Appointed Special Advocate] (or both)” whose role is “to obtain first-hand, a clear understanding of the situation and needs of the child; and to make recommendations to the court concerning the best interests of the child.” [FN36]
Further clarity as to the function and role of the GAL was provided in 2002 when, as part of “ADOPTION 2002: The President's Initiative on Adoption and Foster Care,” the Department of Health and Human Services issued “Guidelines for Public Policy and State Legislation Governing Permanence for Children.” [FN37] The guidelines noted that “the states may appoint an [client-directed] attorney for the child ... in fulfillment of the CAPTA requirement,” and that “states are free to appoint a guardian ad litem, perhaps a volunteer CASA, in addition to an [client-directed] attorney for the child .... This is the preferred approach.” [FN38] While not law, the guidelines were a technical assistance tool designed to help states review their own laws and develop statutes and policies that reflected the best practices in child welfare. [FN39]

During this time, many courts appointed individuals as GAL or attorney for the child without ensuring that he had undergone prior training that adequately addressed the specific types of responsibilities that he would undertake. [FN40] To address this problem, Congress once again amended CAPTA in 2003. [FN41] In a technical assistance bulletin, the Administration for Children and Families stated that the amendment was “to ensure higher quality representation and to bar appointment of untrained or poorly trained court-appointed representatives for children.” [FN42]

CAPTA was the first of several federal statutes that identify the child as the central focus of the dependency proceeding. [FN43] Since it was first passed by Congress in 1974, the Act has been amended several times to provide increasing levels of clarity and guidance to states. CAPTA is due for reauthorization. Amendments aimed to further strengthen and add uniformity to state systems have been proposed by national advocacy organizations. Notably, the National Child Abuse Coalition has advocated for a provision that would require every child in a dependency proceeding to have both an attorney and a GAL. [FN44]

This proposal as well as each aforementioned amendment further Congress’ objective that all children involved in dependency proceedings receive quality, child-centered representation. Recognizing this goal, states have enacted legislation that support a child's right to legal counsel. Furthermore, courts have issued decisions providing additional support.

V. STATE STATUTES AND CASE LAW SUPPORT CHILDREN'S RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS

In 1962, the New York legislature found that “counsel [for minors in Family Court proceedings] is often indispensable to a practical realization of due process of law and may be helpful in making reasoned determinations of fact and proper orders of disposition.” [FN45] Thus, New York became the first state to provide counsel for children in dependency proceedings. To date, nearly forty states (including the District of Columbia) [FN46] recognize the important functions that attorneys serve and have gone beyond the requirements of CAPTA by statutorily mandating legal representation. In the remainder of the states, courts have the discretion to appoint lay volunteers, CASAs, or lawyers. [FN47] In addition to state statutory provisions for legal representation, state case law has recognized a constitutional right.

*611 A. CHILDREN IN NEARLY FORTY STATES HAVE A STATUTORY RIGHT TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION IN DEPENDENCY CASES [FN48]

Legal counsel appointed to represent maltreated children most often do so as the child's GAL, advocating for the child's best interests. [FN49] In most states, the person is called an “attorney-GAL” or an “attorney ad litem.” [FN50] States requiring courts to appoint an attorney-GAL include Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia. The attorney-GAL advocates for the child’s best interests and may or may not be required to inform the court when the child's wishes differ from his recommendation. When the court is made aware of the conflict, a separate GAL or attorney may be appointed. [FN51]
In some states children can receive both a lay GAL and an attorney. [FN52] When both are present in the case, the GAL represents the child's best interests while the attorney usually advocates for the child's expressed wishes. States whose statutes or court rules provide for the appointment of an attorney and a GAL include Arizona, [FN53] North Carolina, [FN54] South Carolina, [FN55] Texas, [FN56] and Vermont. [FN57]

Still other states expect the attorney to represent both the child's wishes and what the attorney deems to be his best interests. [FN58] If a conflict arises, courts in Connecticut, Iowa, Mississippi, New York, and Pennsylvania appoint a separate GAL for the child while the attorney continues to advocate for the child's expressed wishes.

B. STATE CASE LAW HAS RECOGNIZED THE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY CASES

Since 1976 (two years after CAPTA was enacted), several state courts have reinforced a child's right to legal counsel. [FN59] Where state statutes specifically guarantee counsel, some courts have found that the right is both statutory and constitutional. Where state statute does not guarantee counsel, some courts have found this to be a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.

In the earliest case, Roe v. Conn, a three-judge federal district court panel held that the challenged Alabama procedure “violates the due process clause of the Constitution because that procedure does not provide for the appointment of independent counsel to represent a child in a neglect proceeding ....” [FN60] Seventeen years later, a New York Appellate Court, in Matter of Jamie TT, held that it “would be callously ignoring the realities of [the child's] plight during the pendency of this abuse proceeding if we failed to accord her a liberty interest in the outcome of that proceeding, entitling her to the protection of procedural due process.” [FN61] The court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis and concluded that the process due to the child included effective legal representation of her interests. [FN62]

In June 2002, a class action lawsuit, Kenny A. v. Perdue, was filed on behalf of children in the Georgia foster care system. [FN63] The complaint alleged, inter alia, that children in Fulton and Dekalb counties received inadequate assistance of counsel from their court-appointed lawyers. In response to the state's motion for summary judgment, the federal court concluded “plaintiff foster children have both a statutory and a constitutional right to counsel in all [major child welfare] proceedings ....” [FN64]

Four years later, in In re Christina M., parents asserted a claim that their children were denied their constitutional right to conflict-free representation in the proceeding to terminate parental rights. [FN65] “Inherent in the [parents'] claim are several layers of significant constitutional issues, beginning with the most fundamental one of whether children who are the subject of a termination proceeding have a federal and state constitutional right to *612 counsel in addition to the statutory right ....” [FN66] While the Connecticut Supreme Court did not reach the ultimate issue of whether the right was indeed constitutional, it did not reject the claim. Moreover, the court signaled it would draw an analogy to the criminal context if it found a constitutional right existed in a termination proceeding. “In other words, we presume that, should such a constitutional right exist in the termination of parental rights context, the requirements for establishing a violation would, at a minimum, be comparable to those applied to establish the violation in the criminal context.” [FN67]

Thus, while children in nearly forty states have a statutory right to legal representation in dependency proceedings, state cases support and extend that right by emphasizing the important role attorneys play in the administration of justice and creating a constitutional entitlement.

VI. FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS REQUIRES LEGAL COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS

Principles of fundamental fairness support a governmental obligation to ensure children are provided the means to effectively access the dependency court. A child’s right to access the courts and fully participate in his case can only be accomplished with legal representation. Without such representation, children cannot effectively navigate the legal system, “they are denied access to fair and impartial dispute resolution, the adversarial process itself breaks down and the courts cannot perform their role of delivering a just result.” [FN68] Fundamental fairness also requires that children in dependency proceedings be given the same basic right to an attorney as that given to children in the delinquency system.

A. CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS SHOULD RECEIVE EQUIVALENT DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AS CHILDREN IN DELINQUENCY MATTERS

In 1967, the Supreme Court held that children accused of crimes in a delinquency proceeding must be afforded the right to counsel. [FN69] Before Gault, the prevailing notion was that juvenile court proceedings should be informal and based more on a social work model than a legal model. [FN70] Thus, children in juvenile court proceedings were not provided with attorneys. “The Gault decision marked the start of a new way of thinking about legal representation for children and extended to children due process protections when liberty deprivations are at stake.” [FN71]

Per Gault, every jurisdiction provides the right to counsel for juveniles accused of a crime, at least at the adjudicatory hearing. [FN72] While the Supreme Court has not yet afforded children in the dependency system the same right to counsel, the rationale underlying Gault is not limited to delinquency cases. Further, due to the similarities between the court’s function and role in delinquency and dependency cases, the rationale can equally apply to dependency proceedings.

1. The Basis for the Court’s Decision is Equally Applicable to Both Delinquency and Dependency Proceedings

In rendering its decision, the court relied upon the findings and recommendations of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. The commission report stated that “no single action holds more potential for achieving procedural *613 justice for the child in juvenile court than provision of counsel. The presence of an independent legal representative of the child ... is the keystone of the whole structure of guarantees that a minimum system of procedural justice requires.” [FN73]

The portion of the Commission report relied upon by the Court (quoted above) refers to “the child in juvenile court” and does not specifically refer to delinquents.

[T]he juvenile justice system has two separate functions: the “delinquency” function- to deal with status offenders and to determine if a minor has broken the law, and, if so, how he/she should be punished or rehabilitated; and the “dependency,” or “child welfare” function- to protect children who have been abused physically and/or emotionally or neglected by their primary caregivers. [FN74]

As the juvenile court has both a delinquency and dependency function, an argument can be made that the findings and recommendations of the Commission are directed to the juvenile court generally and are therefore equally applicable to both delinquency and dependency proceedings.

2. Children in Dependency Proceedings Experience Similar Injustice from the Lack of Procedural Safeguards

The Court determined that procedural safeguards, including the appointment of counsel for the child, were integral to accurate fact finding and to preventing governmental oppression. “The absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures. Departures from established principles of due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness.” [FN75]

Children in dependency proceedings are similarly disadvantaged by the lack of formality and due process.
“[D]ependency judges make the most important decisions in an ad hoc, chaotic environment without references to any discernible, meaningful standard.” [FN76] Thus, abused and neglected children should be afforded the same safeguards, including the right to counsel, to protect against arbitrary decisions. “Some kind of check for [the judge's] vast power is required, and counsel for the child is the ideal solution.” [FN77]

B. CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS CANNOT NAVIGATE THE SYSTEM WITHOUT LEGAL REPRESENTATION

Dependency proceedings are complex and children cannot act as their own counsel. A child, whose median age at entrance into foster care is 7.5 years old, [FN78] cannot fully understand the legal process or the rights that he possesses. Without legal assistance, children cannot express their opinions within the context of the law, cross-examine witnesses, conduct discovery, or carry out any of the functions performed by a lawyer. Simply put, children lack the skills and knowledge necessary to advocate for themselves effectively. “The most informal and well-intentioned of judicial proceedings are technical; few adults without legal training can influence or even understand them; certainly children cannot.” [FN79] As a result, children who are expected to navigate the legal system without the benefit of counsel are denied access to a fair process.

C. CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS HAVE DISTINCT INTERESTS THAT CANNOT BE REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS OR THE STATE

Lawyers for children are “critically important because they promote a child's interests, under circumstances where the child's parents, and even the state, may have vastly different ideas about what is best for that child.” [FN80] Traditionally, it was assumed that the child's legal interests were aligned with either the state or the parent and, thus, the child's voice would be heard. [FN81] This argument bears a striking similarity to one rejected by the Supreme Court in Gault. [FN82] There, the Court disagreed with a lower court's ruling that the probation officer and the juvenile court could appropriately represent the child due to the role that each played in the process. [FN83] Likewise, the rights of children in dependency hearings cannot be protected by their parents or the state.

Parents involved in the dependency system may have difficulty seeing their child's needs and interests as separate from their own. Because the parent will have her own motivations and interests stemming from his or her involvement with the courts, the parent’s interests are not identical to the child's. [FN84] Similarly, the state “must consider the needs of the system, such as administrative requirements and costs, and the needs of the class of children as a whole.” [FN85] These additional factors likewise interfere with the state's ability to represent the child's interest without constraint.

Although the child's interests are distinct from those of the parent and state, they are not always in conflict. [FN86] In fact, some scholars argue that a substantive conflict between the parent and child exists under the law only if parents are unfit. [FN87] Even when the child, parent, and state agree, however, the child needs legal counsel to address his unique interests, both legal and nonlegal. For example, where all parties agree that the child should be returned to his parents, the child might benefit from services that will aid in his transition. His attorney would be able to evaluate the child's need for the services, advocate effectively for them, and, if necessary, file a motion to compel the government to provide them. In that circumstance, the child needs to be represented by a person who has a duty of loyalty to him alone.

D. ATTORNEYS FOR CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS ARE NEEDED TO PERFORM SIMILAR FUNCTIONS AS THOSE IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS

In Gault, the Supreme Court found that the child “needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon the regularity of the proceeding, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and prepare and submit it.” [FN88] Likewise, attorneys for children in dependency cases are needed to per-

form these essential duties for their clients. [FN89] As in the delinquency context, it is essential to the proper outcome of the dependency case that the attorney for the child introduces any relevant evidence supporting the child's position or challenge, through cross-examination, any evidence that contradicts the client's position.

The child's attorney is uniquely situated to work with both the parent's counsel and the government attorney and can therefore aid in the creation of case plans and placement alternatives. [FN90] On behalf of the child, the attorney can independently investigate the child's needs regarding services, placement, and visitation to ensure that the child's needs are met and properly addressed by the court. The lawyer can also speak to the child about family resources and work with him to identify relative placement options.

Inside the courtroom, the lawyer assists the judge in reaching a well-informed decision. [FN91] Children's attorneys are in the best position to provide the court with information about the child while zealously advocating for the client's position. Lawyers also challenge the state to meet its legal burden when attempting to persuade the court to take measures such as removing the child from his home or terminating parental rights. Due to their legal training, attorneys also perform unique tasks that cannot be carried out by lay persons. *615 These include examining witnesses, informing the client of his legal rights and responsibilities, and representing the child in nondependency-related matters (e.g., special education hearings, immigration proceedings).

Lawyers also assist their clients by filing motions. In a study of the Legal Aid's Foster Children's Project (FCP) in Palm Beach County, Florida, conducted by the Chapin Hall Center for Children in 2008, [FN92] it was reported that the number of motions filed in cases in which the children had lawyers was 46.5 percent higher than in cases without a child's attorney. [FN93] These motions were filed to compel action on the part of another party [FN94] or for the purposes of discovery. As a result, the court conducted 49.6 percent more status checks when a child's lawyer was involved. [FN95]

While some may argue that this increase in court involvement may have a negative effect on children and create an unnecessarily adversarial process, children greatly benefit from increased oversight. [FN96] In fact, judges and attorneys in Palm Beach County viewed such legal activity as appropriate for “keep[ing] things on track.” [FN97] Furthermore, the child's quicker transition to permanency (as will be discussed later) provides additional evidence that attorneys help create a more efficient system for children.

E. THE LEGAL PROFESSION SUPPORTS PROVIDING ATTORNEYS FOR CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS

The ABA has passed several resolutions recognizing the importance of a child's ability and right to attend and fully participate in all hearings related to his case. [FN98] In 2005, the ABA resolved that all dependent youth should “have the right to quality legal representation, not simply an appointed lay guardian ad litem or lay volunteer advocate with no legal training, acting on their behalf ....” [FN99] The next year, the ABA passed a resolution urging federal, state, and territorial governments to provide legal counsel at public expense to low income persons “in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake,” such as those involving child custody. [FN100] In 2007, the ABA once again resolved to provide “all youth with the ability and right to attend and fully participate in all hearings related to their cases.” [FN101] Because dependency proceedings are adversarial and complex, no child can participate fully without a lawyer.

VII. CHILDREN WHO HAVE ATTORNEYS ARE MORE LIKELY TO EXIT FOSTER CARE TO A PERMANENT HOME

Attorneys for children in dependency cases decrease the likelihood that the child will exit the foster care system without achieving legal permanency. [FN102] In a recent study conducted in Palm Beach County, the 832 children represented by the FCP program attorneys experienced exit to permanent homes about 1.5 times more frequently than
children who were not afforded counsel. [FN103] In addition, children moved from case plan approval to permanency at approximately twice the rate (2.01) of comparison children. [FN104]

Children who achieve permanency have better outcomes than those who languish in long-term foster care. Consequently, federal legislation has mandated that states give preference to permanency over long-term foster care. [FN105] One preferred permanency option--when a child cannot be reunited with his parents-- is adoption. Adoption “confers an irreplaceable sense of belonging: emotional security that enhances overall well-being and promotes gains in educational attainment and success in the labor market.” [FN106]

*616* A 2006 study found that adopted children are 15% more likely to be employed and have higher incomes (between $88,000 and $150,000 more over a lifetime) than their counterparts who remain in foster care. [FN107] Adoptees are also 32% less likely to be incarcerated, 16% less likely to have substance abuse issues, and less likely to receive Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) and food stamps. [FN108]

Unfortunately, not all children achieve permanency. Every year, nearly 20,000 youth age out of the foster care system without the stability that ensures their basic needs are met. [FN109] Not surprisingly, aging out is associated with strikingly dire outcomes in an array of well-being indicators, including homelessness, [FN110] criminal involvement, [FN111] mental and physical health, [FN112] education level, [FN113] and reliance on public assistance. [FN114]

Legal counsel has been shown to support permanency outcomes for children in dependency proceedings. By expediting and increasing likelihood of permanency, attorneys not only save the state money (as will be discussed in Part VIII) but can also reduce by over 50% the frequently devastating exit known as aging out [FN115] of the foster care system.

**VIII. THE COST OF PROVIDING ATTORNEYS TO CHILDREN IS MITIGATED BY INCREASED TRANSITIONS TO PERMANENCY**

For those states not already doing so, providing an attorney for each child in the abuse and neglect system would require states to make a significant financial investment. [FN116] The total cost of providing attorneys for children in abuse and neglect cases is dependent upon the total number of children served, the amount of time spent on each case, and the rate of compensation. In 2007, Connecticut Voices for Children (CVC), through the support of the Jim Casey Youth Opportunities Initiative, prepared a white paper advocating for reforms in the representation of children in that state. [FN117] In that paper, CVC examined the costs and benefits of providing legal representation to children and estimated the cost of a high-quality organizational model of representation to be about $1,500 per child per year. [FN118] On the other end of the spectrum, the Palm Beach County pilot program (discussed in Part VI) was given a budget of $4,857.14 per child. [FN119]

Irrespective of the expense, attorneys for children have been shown to provide a benefit not only to the child but to the government as well. In many instances, the cost of providing an attorney would be offset by the positive impact of effective court advocacy on behalf of the child, mainly increased permanency.

**A. INCREASED PERMANENCY RESULTS IN A NET SAVINGS TO FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS**

After children are permanently placed, their cases are closed and monitoring by the child protection agency or the court is no longer required. Thus, increased permanency leads to a reduction in government costs associated with human services. One permanency option is adoption. [FN120] Each adoption from foster care saves the federal and state government approximately $143,000 in child welfare costs. [FN121] Moreover, each adoption nets an additional $190,000 to $235,000 in other savings such as reductions in special education spending and the costs of future in-
volvement in the justice system. [FN122] As previously discussed, the government also enjoys greater tax revenue when children are adopted because adoptees are likely to earn more and pay more in taxes than counterparts who age out of foster care without a permanent family. [FN123]

*617 B. PROVIDING ATTORNEYS TO CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS IS COST EFFECTIVE

No study has specifically addressed the cost effectiveness of providing attorneys to children in dependency cases. [FN124] However, analogies can be made to studies that examine and advocate for other services that might benefit foster youth. Studies, such as the one discussed below, can be used to illustrate the cost savings of effective advocacy on behalf of children in dependency proceedings.

In 2006, the Children's Advocacy Institute (CAI) publicized the results of a cost-benefit analysis which showed a significant cost savings attributed to expanding transitional services available to foster youth who age out of foster care. [FN125] Specifically, CAI considered the cost avoidance from fewer admissions to state prison and less dependence upon TANK. The study also factored in the higher income taxes paid to the state and federal treasuries because of improved lifetime employment earnings through increased education.

The financial benefits evaluated are nearly identical to those attained as a result of increased permanency (due to providing attorneys for children in dependency cases); [FN126] however, the cost is far less. The total cost of providing transition services was estimated at $47,113 over five years, or $9,422.60 per year per former foster youth, while the cost of providing attorneys has been estimated at between $1,500 [FN127] and $4,857.14 per year per child. [FN128] Thus, whereas CAI's analysis revealed a benefit-to-cost ratio of approximately 3:1, [FN129] a similar analysis of providing attorneys would show an even greater benefit-to-cost ratio. [FN130]

IX. COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN SHOULD BE CLIENT DIRECTED (REPRESENTING THE CHILD'S EXPRESSED INTERESTS)

In 2006, First Star conducted an extensive analysis of child representation laws in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. [FN131] In the “National Report Card on Legal Representation for Children,” First Star reported that only seventeen states require that the lawyer appointed to represent children in dependency and foster care proceedings be “client directed.” [FN132]

While children benefit from attorneys whether they serve as GALs [FN133] or function within a more traditional attorney-client model, the role of the child's counsel can significantly impact the child's ability to participate fully in the proceedings. In order to be active participants in their cases, children in dependency court need advocates who value and advance their independent and individual interests. Further, the court needs to be aware of the child's position in order to make its decision. In 2006, Congress emphasized this point when it enacted the Child and Families Services Improvement Act, [FN134] which requires the court to consider the child's views on his permanency or transition plan during the hearing.

A traditional client-directed model of representation empowers the child to have his wishes presented and considered by the court. Using a best interests model exclusively, however, does not give the child an opportunity to explain the case from his point of view. In fact, in many states, the attorney-GAL is not under any legal obligation to inform the court of the child's position. [FN135] “Denying the child a voice in the lawyer's advocacy ‘reinforces ... the lessons, learned most thoroughly by abused and neglected children, that he should not expect to have any control over his fate.’” [FN136] In addition to creating a limitation on the child, lawyers serving as GALs may violate the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC). [FN137]

*618 A. JUDGES, NOT ATTORNEYS, SHOULD DETERMINE WHAT IS IN THE CHILD'S BEST IN-
TERESTS

Attorneys who advocate for the child's best interests substitute their personal judgment, which can be colored by personal bias, when the child's stated goal is deemed contrary to that interest. Best interests represents an amorphous standard that is very difficult, if not impossible, to determine definitively. As such, attorneys often lack the knowledge or expertise to render this opinion.

Left to their own devices, many lawyers are likely to arrive at decisions and advocate for positions on behalf of their child clients that are invariably based on what they believe to be best, based on the only value system they know, their own. Not only is there significant chance that these decisions and ensuing positions may be against the best interest of the individual child, who is likely of a different race, ethnicity, and/or class than the legal representative, but it also leads to a system where the position taken by a child's attorney may largely be based, not on what would be best for the individual child with unique needs and values, but rather on the arbitrary chance of who was appointed to represent the particular child. [FN138]

The proper role of the attorney, therefore, is to provide the court with information that will enable the judge to make the best interests determination.

B. ATTORNEYS SERVING AS GALs MAY LEAD TO VIOLATIONS OF THE MRPC

Unless exempted, lawyers that represent children must honor the same ethical rules and duties that apply to attorneys generally. The MRPC requires attorneys to maintain confidential communications with the client (MR 1.6), abide by the client's determinations as to the objectives of the litigation (MR 1.2), maintain client loyalty (MR 1.2), and refrain from intentionally or knowingly engaging in any activity which creates a conflict of interest (MR 1.7). [FN142]

Lawyers are ethically bound not to disclose the substance of any conversation that they have with their client, whether the client is an adult or a child. [FN143] Therefore, a lawyer must keep confidential any information that the child reveals that may be relevant to the court's decision, unless disclosure is necessary to prevent substantial bodily harm. [FN144] When the attorney is performing his traditional role, this mandate does not present a problem. In fact, it may improve his representation of the client. "When a child is convinced that his secrets are safe with his lawyer, he is likely to share information more candidly, and this greater candor, in turn, will enhance the lawyer's ability to assess the merits of his case, provide good advice, and advocate effectively on his behalf." [FN145]

On the other hand, when serving as a GAL, the attorney is often required to choose between violating the child's confidences and representing the child's best interests. “Consequently, a GAL generally must bend the restrictions of [Model Rule] 1.6 to permit disclosing to the court relevant and necessary information provided by the child. There is no satisfactory way to resolve this ethical dilemma.” [FN146]

Ethical standards may also be violated when an attorney, appointed as a GAL, does not zealously and diligently advocate for their client's stated objective as required by MRPC 1.2. [FN147] In some cases, lawyers not only fail to pursue their client's wishes but intentionally create a conflict by advancing a different position. As previously stated, some states have statutes designed to address this conflict when the court is made aware of its existence.

*619 These remedies do not adequately address the issue because the GAL is presented with an ethical dilemma when disclosing the conflict to the court. [FN148] If the GAL continues in that capacity, he has received information from the child that he may use to support an opposing position. If the GAL becomes the child's attorney, he must zealously advocate for a position to which the court already knows he is personally opposed. No such conflict or ensuing dilemma would be created, however, if only client-directed lawyers are appointed in the first instance.

C. CLIENT-DIRECTED REPRESENTATION PROMOTES A SENSE OF FAIRNESS TO THE CHILD
Dependency proceedings focus on the best interests of the child; however, in many courtrooms the child is not given the opportunity to express his opinion regarding what is in his best interests. Even though the child is usually appointed either a lay person or an attorney to serve as a GAL, the child's opinion may not be expressed to the court. As a result, the child is given the sense that both he and his views are unimportant. As one foster child said, “But judge, childhood is also letting your voice be heard ... But how can I do that if you don't even want to hear what I, one insignificant twelve-year-old, have to say?”[FN149]

On the other hand, children who feel that they have been given the opportunity to meaningfully participate in the process will respect the decision and be more willing to abide by the court's order. Developmental research has established that children, even as young as first grade, are able to evaluate fairness of activities and have a more positive perception of activities they deem to be more fair. [FN150] “In contrast to children who conclude that a judge made a critical decision about their lives without respecting their views and preferences, children who can express their views through counsel may take solace in the rationality of the system that determined their fate- even if the decision is not the one they sought.”[FN151]

D. PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND POLICIES RECOMMEND ATTORNEYS USE A CLIENT-DIRECTED APPROACH WITH CHILD CLIENTS

In addition to the MRPC, lawyers for children are also guided by professional standards and policy mandates that have been developed over the years and which govern their practice. [FN152] In 1995, a conference on representation of children resulted in the Recommendations of the Fordham Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children. [FN153] A year later, the ABA adopted its Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings. [FN154] The National Association of Counsel for Children (NACC) produced a revised version of the ABA standards in 1999 and adopted the NACC Recommendations for Representation of Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases in 2001. [FN155]

In 2003, the ABA House of Delegates approved the Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing Children in Custody Cases. [FN156] In 2006, the William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) published, Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on Representing Children in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham. [FN157] To provide further guidance and uniformity, in 2008, the ABA Section of Litigation Children's Rights Litigation Committee, with the assistance of the Bar-Youth Empowerment Project of the ABA Center on Children and the Law and First Star, drafted the ABA Model Act Governing the Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings. [FN158]

*620 While there are differences among the standards, recommendations, and proposed Model Act, each acknowledges the fundamental principle of client-directed representation for child clients. The ABA Standards of Practice, for example, explicitly recognizes the child as a separate individual with potentially discrete and independent views. “To ensure that the child's independent voice is heard, the child's attorney must advocate the child's articulated positions.” [FN159] This approach to representation requires the attorney to be well-acquainted with the child and his developmental stage, the child's family and important people in the child's life, and the child's interests and needs.

X. CHILDREN HAVE A RIGHT TO WELL-TRAINED ATTORNEYS WHO HAVE REASONABLE CASELOADS

A child's “constitutional and statutory rights to be represented by counsel [are] not satisfied merely by the [s]tate's supplying a lawyer's physical presence in the courtroom. [The child is entitled] to 'adequate' or 'effective' legal assistance. No less than an accused in a criminal case, [the child is] entitled to 'meaningful representation.'”[FN160] Such meaningful representation includes “assistance by an attorney who ha[s] taken the time to prepare presentation of the law and the facts, and employ[s] basic advocacy skills in support of her interests in the case.”[FN161] A child's
right to effective counsel was also highlighted in *Kenny A.*: “The right to counsel, of course, means effective counsel.” [FN162] This level of representation requires adequate training and reasonable caseloads. [FN163]

A. COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING IS ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDING EFFECTIVE LEGAL ASSISTANCE

To fulfill their role consistent with the MRPC [FN164] and professional standards, attorneys representing children must have proper training. Not only does training benefit the child by helping to standardize the quality of representation and assure a minimum level of attorney proficiency, the court also benefits from trained attorneys. “Judges cannot serve families and children effectively without competent and well-prepared attorneys.” [FN165]

It is essential that attorneys who represent children receive specific training for their role. [FN166] Many lawyers have not been provided training in interviewing and counseling clients and have little knowledge of child development. Attorneys handling child welfare cases must have standard legal training in trial skills and child welfare law as well as courses on child development, child psychology, and child interviewing. “Other critical issues for the child's lawyer are training in the many dimensions of introducing the lawyer's role, asking children questions to put them at ease, listening for useful and reliable information, explaining the confidential nature of the relationship, and counseling children through the difficult legal proceedings.” [FN167]

Only twenty-eight jurisdictions require attorneys to have training prior to appointment and/or continuing legal education (CLE) to enhance the attorney's knowledge of issues related to his representation. [FN168] Although the general training requirements are similar, there are vast differences among individual state programs. For example, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Maine, Virginia, and the District of Columbia each have initial training and CLE requirements. However, only Maine requires training in child psychology and development. Rhode Island, Virginia, and the District of Columbia require attorneys to participate in in-courtroom training; Massachusetts has an out-of-court mentor requirement. These variances complicate efforts to create more uniform standards of practice. [FN169]

*621* National certification programs help states ensure high quality representation. In 2006, the NACC developed a certification program to become a Child Welfare Law Specialist. [FN170] The objective of the program is to help achieve safety, permanency, and well-being for children through improved legal representation. Through the program attorneys receive their credentials by demonstrating proficiency in child welfare law through a comprehensive child welfare law competency process. Currently, the program is available in eight jurisdictions [FN171] but it is anticipated that all fifty-one jurisdictions will be open to NACC certification by the end of 2009. [FN172]

Due to the rarity of such training programs, First Star found an overall lack of sufficient training necessary for children's attorneys to provide adequate representation to their clients. [FN173] The organization suggested that child welfare attorneys could benefit from multidisciplinary training programs and certification and has begun providing such training through its First Star Multidisciplinary Centers of Excellence. [FN174] In addition, First Star urged Congress to amend CAPTA to require that attorneys be trained in accordance with the ABA standards. [FN175]

The ABA standards call upon the courts to play a key role in providing training and continuing education opportunities. [FN176] Trial judges who are regularly involved in child-related matters should participate in training for the child's attorney. The standards promulgated in 2003 (as well as the 1996 standards) outline what the training for lawyers representing children in custody cases should include. Effective advocacy requires the attorney to be knowledgeable about relevant state and federal laws, agency regulations, court decisions and court rules; the applicable legal standards; applicable representation guidelines and standards; the court process and key personnel in child-related litigation, including custody evaluations and mediation; child development, needs, and abilities at different ages; communicating with children; and preparing and presenting a child's viewpoint, including testimony and alternatives to direct testimony. [FN177]

Counsel for children also need to be trained on recognizing, evaluating, and understanding evidence of child
abuse and neglect; family dynamics and dysfunction; domestic violence and substance abuse; information on multidisciplinary input required in child-related cases, including information on local experts who can provide consultation and testimony; available services for child welfare, family preservation, mental health, educational, and special needs, including placement, evaluation/diagnostic, and treatment services; provisions and constraints related to agency payment for services; and basic information about state and federal laws and treaties on child custody jurisdiction, enforcement, and child abduction. [FN178]

In 2008, the president signed into law the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act (P.L. 110-351). The Act expands the availability of federal funds to train attorneys representing children in child protection proceedings. It is hopeful that this new legislation will motivate states to provide much needed training to lawyers engaged in this very specialized and demanding area of practice. In addition, extra resources may permit more children's attorneys to attend trainings offered by providers such as the NACC and First Star.

B. CASELOADS MUST BE REASONABLE TO ENSURE ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION

While adequate training is necessary to provide a foundation for quality representation, such representation is also affected by the size of the attorney's caseload. Unreasonably high caseloads make it impossible for lawyers to provide representation that is constitutionally adequate. [FN179] These caseloads prohibit attorneys from providing effective child advocacy both within and outside of the courtroom.

Lawyers must have the time and ability to meet with their clients on a consistent and regular basis, investigate the case, and identify their client's needs. Fewer cases provide attorneys with the opportunity to become better acquainted with their clients, thereby encouraging more holistic representation. As one attorney reported, “By keeping my caseload low ... I am able to get to know my clients well, meet with them where they are living, and build the trust required to hear their desires, investigate cases fully, and better advocate for them. I also have time to more thoroughly research legal issues in my cases, so the level of practice in Family Court may be improved.” [FN180]

Unfortunately, many attorneys representing children report having high caseloads. [FN181] Due to the prevalence of this problem, standards for maximum caseloads have been adopted. NACC recommends caseloads of no more than 100 children per attorney per year. This figure assumes twenty hours of work per child per year and that the lawyer has adequate support staff. [FN182] This standard is also acknowledged by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Administration for Children and Families Children's Bureau. [FN183]

Many states have attempted to follow the NACC national guideline, however, recommendations for caseload standards are not always followed and some jurisdictions have opted for higher standards. In 2006, Dekalb County, Georgia, through its consent decree in Kenny A., established a caseload cap of 130. [FN184] A recently enacted New York court rule states that “the number of children represented at any given time by an attorney ... shall not exceed 150.” [FN185]

After conducting a comprehensive caseload study of court-appointed dependency counsel, [FN186] California adopted caseload standards of a maximum of 188 cases per attorney for attorneys who have appropriate support staff. [FN187] Currently, however, the statewide average is 273, with some counties experiencing attorney caseloads of between 500 and 600. [FN188]

In keeping with the belief that lower caseloads lead to better performance, [FN189] some states have adopted or been encouraged to adopt standards that set the caseload maximum much lower than that recommended by NACC. Wyoming, for instance, has defined a reasonable caseload as no more than sixty-five juvenile cases. [FN190] The Wyoming court determined that a lower caseload was necessary to ensure that attorneys had adequate time to provide the investigation and advocacy necessary to secure appropriate outcomes for dependent children and their families. [FN191] Connecticut Voices for Children, in a recent white paper, advocated for a cap of eighty clients per year for

attorneys working full-time on these cases. [FN192] This cap assumes 2,000 hours of representation annually and twenty-five hours per client.

Where states have not established clear mandates regarding caseload size, courts should take steps to ensure that lawyers appointed to represent children are not prohibited from complying with appropriate standards of practice due to overwhelming caseloads. Lawyers also have an ethical responsibility to decline representation when accepting a case would interfere with their ability to provide constitutionally adequate representation. [FN193] In Nebraska, for example, the Supreme Court adopted guidelines that dissuade attorney-GALs from maintaining caseloads “that by reason of their excessive size or demands ... interfere with or lead to the breach of the professional obligations or standards required to be met by a guardian ad litem by statute or by court rule.” [FN194]

In 2005, the ABA passed a resolution aimed at foster care reform. [FN195] In that resolution, the ABA urged Congress, states, and territories to enact and/or adopt laws and policies consistent with recommendations of the national bipartisan May 2004 Pew Commission on *623 Children in Foster Care for improving outcomes for abused and neglected children under dependency court jurisdiction. Those recommendations included the development and implementation of national protocols and standards for reasonable attorney caseloads; federal and state support for attorney training; and development, implementation of, and funding for, qualification and training standards for dependency counsel. In addition, Court Improvement Program projects across the country have adopted several strategies to address high caseloads, and some child welfare attorneys have attempted to address the issue through ethics opinions and class action litigation. [FN196]

XI. CONCLUSION

The U.S. Constitution, federal and state legislation, court decisions, and public policy all provide support for a child's right to counsel. Despite an increased recognition of this right, many states still do not provide an abused and neglected child with a lawyer who will advocate for his expressed wishes, thereby stripping the child of the opportunity to have a voice in decisions that will profoundly affect his life. Furthermore, there remains an overall lack of quality, trained, and independent legal representation for children in the dependency system.

Lawyers are the keystone to ensuring fairness, accuracy, and appropriateness of court decisions. Studies have shown that, in addition to protecting a client's rights, a child's attorney can improve his client's life by ensuring that the child's well-being is an integral part of the court process and by taking steps that can expedite permanency. Attorneys also ensure fairness of the dependency process, contribute to conserving judicial resources, and support the state's fiscal interests.

Unfortunately, there are no national mandates defining the role attorneys should play in representing children, the type of training they should receive, or the limit on the size of their caseload. Thus, national organizations and advocacy groups have promulgated standards and states have enacted statutes and court rules attempting to address these issues.

While seventeen states have recognized the importance and necessity of providing client-directed attorneys that advocate for the child's expressed wishes, merely appointing an attorney does not, in and of itself, protect the child's constitutional right to due process. The child must have the assistance of a client-directed attorney that has been trained properly and whose caseload does not prohibit him from providing competent counsel. CAPTA's vision of full representation for all children will only be realized when these goals are achieved.

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[FN1]. The Bar-Youth Empowerment Project thanks the Project's national advisory board and Diane Boyd Rauber for their editorial assistance and Julian Darwall for his invaluable and extensive research assistance.


[FN4]. ASFA requires permanency review hearings at least every six months and permanency hearings every twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) & (C) (2008).

[FN5]. Parents involved in dependency courts do not have a constitutional right to representation; however, many states recognize the need for parents to have legal counsel. In an analysis of state statutes, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ) Project found that thirty-nine state statutes provide that counsel be appointed to indigent parents. See NCJFCJ, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES: REPRESENTATION AS A CRITICAL COMPONENT OF EFFECTIVE PRACTICE (March 1998), available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/content/blogcategory/366/435/. In most jurisdictions, the child is provided a nonattorney GAL or an attorney-GAL who advocates for his best interests, not his expressed wishes. Id.

[FN6]. CHILDREN'S LAW CENTER AND HOME AT LAST, MY VOICE, MY LIFE, MY FUTURE, supra note 2.

[FN7]. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (lack of adequate procedures used by school in suspending students violated due process); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that minors have due process right to counsel in delinquency proceedings).


[FN10]. See Erik Pitchal, Children's Constitutional Right to Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 663 (Summer 2006); Jacob Ethan Smiles, A Child's Due Process Right to Legal Counsel in Abuse and Neglect Dependency Proceedings, 37 FAM. L.Q. 485 (Fall 2003).


[FN12]. Id.

[FN13]. At this hearing, the judge must determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child is deprived and whether the child should be returned to his parents or retained in state custody until the adjudicatory hearing.
During the adjudicatory hearing, the court hears evidence and makes a determination on the merits of whether the child has been maltreated.

At the dispositional hearing, the court determines, among other things, whether the child will be removed from his home and with whom the child will be placed.

In accordance with the Adoption and Safe Families Act, the court conducts permanency review hearings at least every six months and permanency hearings every twelve months.

See, e.g., Michael Wald, *State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for Realistic Standards*, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 993-94 (1975) (“Removing a child from his family may cause serious psychological damage—damage more serious than the harm intervention is supposed to prevent”).

The state is the supreme guardian of all children within its jurisdiction and state courts have the inherent power to intervene to protect the best interests of children whose welfare is jeopardized.


The study estimated the net cost of providing legal representation to children to be thirty-two dollars per day.


Battered child syndrome refers to injuries sustained by a child as a result of physical abuse, usually inflicted by an adult caregiver. Alternative terms include shaken baby, shaken baby syndrome, child abuse, and nonaccidental trauma.

JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS:

ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 33 (3rd ed. 2007).


[FN31]. Id.

[FN32]. The original version of the law passed by the Senate contained no mention of the need for independent legal representation of the child. It was not until subsequent committee hearings that this issue was addressed in testimony given by Brian Fraser, then staff attorney for the National Center for Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect. It was Fraser who played the primary role in the inclusion of the guardian ad litem requirement in the final law. Fraser had previously authored an article on the role of guardians ad litem, which broadly defined their duties to include both legal and nonlegal activities. Fraser's view of the GAL was as a “special guardian” legally obligated to do everything within his power to insure a judgment that is in the child's best interests, including acting as investigator, advocate, counsel, and guardian. Rebecca Heartz, National CASA Association, Guardians Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: Clarifying the Roles to Improve Effectiveness, 27 FAM. L.Q. 327 (1993), available at http://www.casanet.org/library/guardian-ad-litem/gal-e-section2.htm.

[FN33]. Id.

[FN34]. Id. at 329.

[FN35]. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, supra note 30 (In the early years of implementation, even without statutory mandate to do so, most judges appointed attorneys as GALs).


[FN37]. DONALD N. DUQUETTE, GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND STATE LEGISLATION GOVERNING PERMANENCE FOR CHILDREN, (Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Administration on Children, Youth and Families, Children's Bureau, 2002).

[FN38]. DONALD N. DUQUETTE, GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND STATE LEGISLATION GOVERNING PERMANENCE FOR CHILDREN (Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Administration on Children, Youth and Families, Children's Bureau, 1999) (Option 15A states, “We recommend that the child's attorney representation be client directed, that is, the child's attorney shall in all circumstances fulfill the same duties of zealous advocacy, loyalty, confidentiality, and competent representation as are due an adult child. The child's attorney should represent the child's expressed preferences and follow the child's direction throughout the course of litigation”).

[FN39]. Id.


See Welte, supra note 40 (the bulletin cites the standards of practice developed by the ABA and the NACC as appropriate training for lawyers representing children in abuse and neglect cases).

In 2006, Congress enacted the Child and Families Services Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C). This Act contains a requirement that foster care proceedings include, in an age-appropriate manner, consultation with the child that is the subject of the proceedings. The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services Administration for Children and Families Children’s Bureau does not interpret the term “consult” to require a court representative to pose a literal question to a child or require the physical presence of the child at a permanency hearing. However, the child's views on the child's permanency or transition plan must be obtained by the court for consideration during the hearing. Children's Bureau, 8.3C.2c Title IV-E, Foster Care Maintenance Payments Program, State Plan/Procedural Requirements, Case review system, permanency hearings, ADMIN. FOR CHIDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., Aug. 7, 2007, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/j2ee/programs/cb/laws_policies/laws/cwpm/qaHistory.jsp?citID=58&id=1720.

Conversation with Thomas L. Birch, JD, Legislative Counsel, National Child Abuse Coalition (Jan. 5, 2009).


When determining whether to appoint an attorney through the Office of the Child Advocate or a Court-Appointed Special Advocate through the Family Court, the Family Court judge, in his or her discretion, should assign the most complex and serious cases to the Office of the Child Advocate.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §701 (c) (2006).

See generally NACC, NACC Recommendations for Representation of Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases (2001), available at http://www.naccchildlaw.org/resource/resmgr/resource_center/nacc_standards_and_recommend.pdf. As will be discussed, the states have different representation models. Listed cite provides a good discussion of the pros and cons of each model.

The Fordham Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children recommended that laws currently authorizing the appointment of a lawyer to serve in a legal proceeding as the child's guardian ad litem be amended to authorize instead the appointment of a lawyer to represent the child in the proceeding. The conference further recommended that conflicting laws requiring children's lawyers to assume responsibility inconsistent with those of a client-directed lawyer be eliminated.

While this approach is most common, as discussed in Part IX, attorneys who advocate for their client's best interests are at risk of violating ethical rules. Further, most lawyers have not received sufficient training to make subjective determinations about what is best for their child client.

When a GAL is appointed, he represents the child’s best interests and the former attorney-GAL represents the child’s expressed wishes. If an attorney is appointed, that attorney represents the child’s expressed interests while the attorney-GAL continues to advocate for the child’s best interests.
As previously discussed, this approach is preferred under the “Guidelines for Public Policy and State Legislation Governing Permanence for Children” and the scheme for which the National Child Abuse Coalition is advocating. Supra note 38.

YALE LAW SCHOOL, REPRESENTING CHILDREN WORLDWIDE (2005), http://www.law.yale.edu/RCW/rcw/jurisdictions/am_n/usa/arizona/frontpage.htm. Courts are permitted to appoint both an attorney and a GAL, but it is much more common for the attorney to act both as an attorney and a GAL. However, if there is a conflict between the child's wishes and best interests, the attorney must represent the child's wishes and request the appointment of a separate GAL.

North Carolina General Statutes § 7B-600. Appointment of guardian http://law.justia.com/northcarolina/codes/chapter_7b/gs_7b-600.html. In North Carolina, when a petition alleging abuse or neglect is filed, the judge shall appoint a GAL to represent the juvenile. In every case where a nonattorney is appointed as a GAL, an attorney for the child shall be appointed in the case to assure protection of the child's legal rights throughout the proceeding.

See S.C. CHILDREN'S CODE tit. 63, § 63-3-810 (2008). In abuse and neglect proceedings, the court is statutorily required to appoint both a GAL and an attorney for the child.

See TEXAS FAMILY CODE § 107.012 (2007). Representation by an Attorney ad Litem (AAL) and a GAL is mandatory in cases in which the government is seeking conservatorship of the child in response to child abuse or neglect allegations or is seeking termination of parental rights.

YALE LAW SCHOOL, REPRESENTING CHILDREN WORLDWIDE (2005), http://www.law.yale.edu/RCW/rcw/jurisdictions/am_n/usa/vermont/frontpage.htm; VT. CT. RULES, RULES FOR FAMILY PROCEEDINGS, §§ 2, 3.6, 6.1, 7 (2009), http://www.michie.com/vermont/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0. The Rules for Family Proceedings require that a child who is the subject of a juvenile court proceeding be represented both by counsel and by a GAL.

The mere expression of a child's wishes by a lawyer who then undermines the child's stated position by arguing for or presenting evidence supporting the opposite result fails to provide the child with a meaningful voice. This approach creates an ethical dilemma for the attorney, who must refrain from intentionally or knowingly engaging in any activity which creates a conflict of interest. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009).


Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 780 (1967) (The Plaintiffs maintained that the Alabama child custody procedure violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution because it did not provide for the appointment of independent counsel to represent a child in a neglect proceeding).


Id.


Id. at 1357. While the case was decided under the Georgia state constitution, it was premised on a Due Process Clause with language nearly identical to the federal constitution.
[FN65]. In re Christina M., 908 A.2d 1073, 1083 (Conn. 2006).

[FN66]. Id. at 1083

[FN67]. Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that the record did not support the parents' claim that a conflict existed between the child's expressed wishes and her attorney's position during trial.


[FN69]. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (lack of adequate procedures used by school in suspending students violated due process); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that minors have due process right to counsel in delinquency proceedings).


[FN74]. GRIMES, supra note 70.

[FN75]. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (lack of adequate procedures used by school in suspending students violated due process); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that minors have due process right to counsel in delinquency proceedings) 18-19


[FN77]. Pitchal, supra note 10.

[FN78]. THE AFCARS REPORT, supra note 3. While the median age for children entering care is 7.5 years old, attorneys may be appointed to represent children who, due to their minority, are unable to direct the representation and make their wishes known. In such circumstances, the attorney should determine whether the child is “under a disability” pursuant to the MRPC or the Model Code of Professional Responsibility with respect to each issue in which the child is called upon to direct the representation. If the child is under a disability, the attorney should refer to Model Rule 1.14. See also Emily Buss, You're My What? The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of Their Lawyer's Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1715 (1996) (discussing children's developing capacity to comprehend the lawyer's role and the ethical issues implicated by children's role confusion).


[FN81]. Children were originally viewed as chattel and had few participatory rights. Over time, children have been recognized as parties to the proceeding in some state and significant participants in others. The passage of CAPTA signaled an acknowledgment that children in dependency cases have interests that are separate and distinct from their parents and the state.

[FN82]. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 34.

[FN83]. Id. In Arizona, probation officers were also arresting officers who initiate proceedings and testify against the child. The judge could not represent the child because his role was to determine whether the child was delinquent.

[FN84]. This conclusion assumes that the parent is actively participating in the proceeding. In the case of abandonment, for example, the parent generally has no communication with the court or the child.

[FN85]. Robyn-Marie Lyons, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 CAL. L. REV. 681, 686 (1987). A similar argument can be made regarding the relationship between the state and other persons in state custody, such as prisoners or psychiatric patients.

[FN86]. But see Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (N.D.Ga. 2005) at 1359 (“there is an inherent conflict of interests between the child and his or her parent, guardian, or custodian, which requires appointment of separate counsel for the child”).

[FN87]. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 111-12 (1973); see also Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need for Counsel for Children in Custody, Visitation and Child Protection Proceedings, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 299, 344 (1998). Goldstein et al. argued that assigning a lawyer to represent a child over a parent's objection before a judicial declaration of parental unfitness violates the parent's right to control the upbringing of her child. See Martin Guggenheim, How Children's Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 Nev. L.J. 805 (Spring 2006); “In cases when unfitness is alleged but unproven, children and their parents have overlapping, but divergent interests.” Pitchal, supra note 10, at 685.

[FN88]. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that minors have due process right to counsel in delinquency proceedings) at 36.

[FN89]. Id. For example, without attorneys to “insist on the regularity” of permanency proceedings, permanency for the child would be delayed.

[FN90]. ZINN & SLOWRIVER, supra note 22. In the Palm Beach County study, it was noted that a number of informed participants that the FCP lawyer made efforts to influence the nature of the case plans and, in particular, the conditions required for reunification.

[FN91]. Veazey v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382, 390 (Alaska 1977). The basic premise of the adversary system is that the best decision will be reached if each interested person had his case presented by counsel of unquestionably undivided loyalty.

[FN92]. ZINN & SLOWRIVER, supra note 22. The Children's Services Council of Palm Beach County contracted
with the Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County in July 2001 to provide legal representation to children three years of age and younger entering shelter care in Palm Beach County. In April 2006, the Children's Services Council and Legal Aid contracted with Chapin Hall Center for Children at the University of Chicago to conduct a third-party evaluation of the program. The primary purpose of the study was to examine the impact that the program has had on the nature and timing of children's permanency outcomes. As the study is the first of its kind, it is somewhat limited in scope. Despite its limitations, it provides invaluable insight into the impact that attorneys for children have in dependency cases.

[FN93]. Id.

[FN94]. Such motions may include motions to compel the state to provide services or visitation with siblings. Motions may also be used to review issues related to the child's placement.

[FN95]. Id.

[FN96]. See also, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that minors have due process right to counsel in delinquency proceedings) at 38, n. 65 (quoting the National Crime Commission Report, “Fears have been expressed that lawyers would make juvenile court proceedings adversary. No doubt this is partly true, but it is partly desirable. Informality is often abused.”)

[FN97]. ZINN & SLOWRIVER, supra note 22.

[FN98]. In addition to the ABA, several other organizations and conferences have stressed the importance of providing attorneys to children. See discussion in Part IX.

[FN99]. A.B.A. Resolutions on Foster Care and Adoption: Foster Care Reform (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/child/foster-adopt.shtml. The August 2005 Foster Care Reform resolution also urges states to attract and retain effective, trained, and qualified lawyers in the dependency practice area by (i) development and implementation of reasonable compensation for dependency counsel, that is not tied to the volume of cases or clients a lawyer represents; (ii) establishment of loan forgiveness programs for attorneys who enter or currently practice in this area; (iii) development and implementation of national protocols and standards for reasonable attorney caseloads; (iv) federal and state support for attorney training; and (v) development, implementation of, and funding for, qualification and training standards for dependency counsel.


[FN102]. “Permanency” means that child has a safe, stable, custodial environment in which to grow up and a life-long relationship with a nurturing caregiver.

[FN103]. ZINN & SLOWRIVER, supra note 22.

[FN104]. Id. Notably, the increase in exits to adoption and long-term relative custody did not decrease the likelihood of family reunification. While children in the sample were three times more likely to exit to adoption, they were also 25% more likely to be reunified with their parents.
[FN105]. Two major pieces of federal foster care legislation, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act and the Adoption and Safe Families Act were enacted to ensure that children who cannot return to their family or extended family do not remain in long-term foster care.


[FN108]. Id.


[FN110]. In New York City, the Department of Homeless Services estimated that 23% of children who age out of foster care enter homeless shelters. *The Needs of Youth Aging out of Foster Care, Public hearing before Assembly Standing committee on Children and Families and Assembly Subcommittee on Foster Care* (NY 2007). In another sample, 80% of homeless youth did not earn enough to be self-supporting four years after aging out, with 50% unemployed and 25% experiencing homelessness. RONNA COOK, A NATIONAL EVALUATION OF TITLE IV-E FOSTER CARE INDEPENDENT LIVING PROGRAMS FOR YOUTH (1991).

[FN111]. The Courtney and Piliavin study (2001) found 25% males who aged out without a permanent placement had been incarcerated at least once in a six-month period within twelve to eighteen months after leaving custody. The Midwest Study (2005) study found a 24% arrest rate among males within a year of aging out. Seminal research on a sample of California children who had not reached permanency found that 35% of the discharged youths had been arrested or convicted. Richard P. Barth, *On Their Own: The Experiences of Youth After Foster Care, I* CHILD AND ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 419 (1990).

[FN112]. The Illinois Child Well-Being Study, a longitudinal analysis of 400 children, found clinical and borderline levels of behavior and mental health diagnoses associated with lack of exit to permanency and found the rate of posttraumatic stress disorder at 25%. The Midwest study sample of children that did not exit to permanency found that the majority were without health insurance and that 15% had developed a mental health or substance disorder after the first year of aging out. COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 109. Over two-fifths of former foster children who had aged out scored highly on a depression scale. CAROL BRADFORD & DIANA J. ENGLISH, OFF. OF CHILD. ADMIN. RES., FOSTER YOUTH TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENT STUDY 26 (2004).

[FN113]. In a 2001 study of individuals who had aged out of care within the prior two to four years, only about 50% of the sample had completed high school or received a GED. KIMBERLY NOLLAN & CHRIS DOWNS, *Preparing Youth for Long-term Success* PROCEEDINGS FROM THE CASEY FAMILY PROGRAM NATIONAL INDEPENDENT FORUM 454 (2001). In a 1998 study, only 9% of the study sample of who had aged out had entered college. Child Welfare, 80, 685-717. Mark E. Courtney et al., *Foster Youth Transitions to Adulthood: A Longitudinal View of Youth Leaving Care*, 80 CHILD WELFARE 685 (2001). A 2005 study found that children exiting to permanency were twice as likely to have a high school diploma or GED as their age group peers who had not reached permanency. COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 109.

[FN114]. Of the 2001 sample, under half of the approximately 600 individuals studied maintained stable employment after aging out. NOLLAN & DOWNS, supra note 113.

[FN115]. Aging out is the case outcome for youth who exit foster care because they have reached the age of majority.
See REPORT OF THE 100% REPRESENTATION WORK GROUP, FLORIDA BAR FOUNDATION CHILDREN'S LEGAL SERVICES GRANTEES (2008). The estimated budget of $5,377,448 contemplates a model program staffed by attorneys, paralegals, social workers, and administrative assistants and includes human resources, accounting, and information technology support. Further, the model program would serve children who had achieved permanency, former foster youth and child who meet the criteria for dependency but for whom no petition is pending.


That estimate assumes that each attorney will spend between 1500 and 2000 hours annually representing between sixty and eighty children and be compensated at a rate of $60/hour.

The total budget for the project was $1.7 million. Ten FCP attorneys had a caseload of approximately thirty-five children. The budget for a proposed two-county pilot program in Washington state that would provide legal representation to all children age twelve and over was approximately $440,000 a year. However, the budget did not include the exact number of children who would be served. Bill Number: 3048 HB Multiple Agency Fiscal Note Summary.

This article does not contend that, as a policy goal, adoption is superior to reunification.

Hansen, supra note 107. An adoption costs the state and federal government approximately $115,000 but saves about $258,000 thus, a net savings of $143,000. See also Richard Barth et al., A Comparison of the Governmental Costs of Long-Term Foster Care and Adoption, 80 SOC. SERVICES REV. 127 (2006) (found that a child who is adopted will cost the government approximately $21,000 less over the first 7.7 years than one who remains in foster care. If certain conditions are met, the total project governmental savings could range from $3,271,100,000 to $6,341,250,000 through age eighteen).

This article does not contend that, as a policy goal, adoption is superior to reunification.

Although the Palm Beach study estimated the net cost of providing legal representation to be $32 per day, its primary purpose was to examine the impact that attorneys had on the nature and timing of children's permanency outcomes. Further, it only considered the reduction of costs of substitute care and case management that accrue from expedited permanency.


See discussion in Part VII.

Bowen et al. supra note 117.

The program's total budget was $1.7 million. Ten attorneys represented 35 children each.

2.98 to 1 (or 1.85 to 1 present value) for one cohort and 3.1 to 1 (or 1.9 to 1 present value) for forty cohorts.

This conclusion should in no way be interpreted to suggest that older adolescents in the dependency system
should not be provided expanded transitional services, whether or not they have an attorney, as the two are not mutually exclusive.

[FN131]. WHYNTI KERNODLE FREDERICK & DEBORAH L. SAMS, RIGHT TO COUNSEL: FIRST STAR'S NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR CHILDREN (2007).

[FN132]. Id. The seventeen states with a mandated client-directed model of representation are: Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia.


[FN135]. Even when the attorney-GAL is required to inform the court of the child's position, they do not have the same zealous advocacy obligations as traditional attorneys. Therefore, the child's position is minimalized.


[FN141]. Id.


[FN143]. MRPCR 1.6 cmt. (1983).

[FN144]. MRPC 1.6 provides limited circumstances when a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client, such as when the client gives informed consent or the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation. Lawyers may also reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. MRPC 1.14.
permits an attorney taking protective action for a client with diminished capacity to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests.

[FN145]. Supra note 137.

[FN146]. Renne, supra note 137 (“[E]ven if a GAL succeeds in avoiding direct and indirect disclosure of the client's secrets, she will certainly undermine the broader confidentiality interest ... that is, the client's interest in ensuring that his otherwise secret statements are only used to further his desired ends. This broader confidentiality obligation, so central to representation by a lawyer with undivided loyalties, cannot be squared with the GAL approach.”)

[FN147]. Because the GAL’s duty of loyalty as the lawyer for the child is contrary to the GAL’s statutory duty to the court, some states, such as Wyoming, have amended their versions of the rule to exclude GALs from complying with MRPC 1.2.

[FN148]. Such provisions also assume that the GAL will disclose the conflict to the court.

[FN149]. CHILDREN'S LAW CENTER AND HOME AT LAST, MY VOICE, MY LIFE, MY FUTURE, supra note 2.


[FN162]. Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (N.D.Ga. 2005) at 1361. The court held that “effective assistance of counsel by a child advocate attorney requires that he or she carry out certain minimum legal tasks as part of the representation. These tasks include meeting with the child prior to court hearings and when apprised of emergencies or significant events impacting the child; conducting investigations and discovery, including interviewing individuals involved with the child, such as caseworkers and foster parents, and reviewing all judicial, medical, social services, educational, and other records pertaining to the child; evaluating the child's need for particular services; monitoring the implementation of all court orders; participating in all hearings; and filing all relevant motions and appeals.” Id. at 1362.


[FN164]. The MRPC also requires competent representation.


[FN166]. As discussed in Part IV, CAPTA was amended in 2003 to require states receiving federal funds to certify that each court-appointed children's lawyer or GAL was a person “who has received training appropriate to the role.” Supra note 30; 42 U.S.C. §5106a (b)(2)(A)(xiii) (West 2009).

[FN167]. PETERS, supra note 29.

[FN168]. First Star, supra note 46.

[FN169]. Standards also vary within individual states. In California, Rule of Court 1438, requires that each county develop adopt rules of court regarding the appointment of competent counsel in dependency proceedings. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317.6(a) (1996).


[FN173]. Id.

[FN174]. Information on First Star's multidisciplinary centers of excellence is available at http://www.firststar.org/education/default.asp.

[FN175]. Information on First Star's Congressional Roundtable on Children is available at http://www.firststar.org/research/roundtable.asp.


[FN177]. Id.


[FN180]. Id. at 8.

[FN181]. Id. at 7. A survey found that 17.6% of all respondents had caseloads of 200 and over and 24.9% had caseloads between 100 and 199. In April 2008, it was reported that assistant public defenders in Oklahoma County had caseloads between 1000 and 1250 children. Nolan Clay and Randy Ellis, National Panel Faults Oklahoma County System, THE OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 27, 2008.

[FN182]. Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (N.D.Ga. 2005) at 1362. In Kenny A., NACC Executive Director Marvin Ventrell testified that the recommended caseload limit is meant to apply regardless of how many support staff an attorney might have and assumes that that child advocate attorneys are not required to perform non-legal, administrative tasks.

[FN183]. Supra note 38. Other recommendations regarding caseloads have not provided a specific number of cases or individuals that attorneys can represent effectively. For example, the UNLV Conference recommended that “attorneys for children receive ... reasonable caseloads.” (H.2.b.iv) and the Fordham Conference proposed caseloads “appropriate for competent and effective representation of each client.” Special Issue on Legal Representation of Children: Appendix: Recommendations of the Fordham Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, 6 NEV. L.J. 1408, 1422 (2006).

[FN185]. Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge, Part 127, § 127.5(a). The workload standards may be adjusted based on factors such as the availability and use of support staff. § 127.5(b), Available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/rules/chiefadmin/127.shtml.

[FN186]. The study recommended that a maximum caseload of 141 clients per full-time dependency attorney as the base-level standard of performance; a maximum of seventy-seven clients was identified as necessary for an optimal, or best practice, standard of performance.

[FN187]. Dependency Counsel Caseload Study and Service Delivery Model Analysis, (June 2004); prepared for the Administrative Office of the Courts by The American Humane Association Denver, Colorado; the Spangenberg Group, West Newton, Massachusetts. The findings of this study served as the foundation for Dependency Representation, Administration, Funding and Training (“DRAFT”) Program, Administrative office of the Courts, Center for Families, Children and the Courts, October 2007 report to the Judicial Council. See also Dependency Counsel Caseload Standards: A Report to the California Legislature (April 2008), Judicial Council of California, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/resources/publications/articles.htm.

[FN188]. JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS.: CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE (2008). The Blue Ribbon Commission is recommending that the Judicial Council seek the funding needed to implement the standard. The estimated cost of implementation is $57.14 million. It is virtually impossible to meaningfully represent clients when caseloads are at this level.

[FN189]. See also Davidson & Pitchal, supra note 179.

[FN190]. WY R UNIF DIST CTS Rule 106(e)(2) (according to Stacy Obrec, Director of the Office of the State Public Defender GAL Program, the average caseload is ten to fifteen children because the attorneys work part-time. The highest caseload is just under forty children. Newly proposed rules will establish a caseload cap of eighty cases for full-time attorneys and forty cases for part-time attorneys. Each judge determines whether “case” means an individual child or a family).

[FN191]. Id.

[FN192]. Bowen et al., supra note 117.

[FN193]. MPRC 1.7(b) prohibits attorneys from representing clients “if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client.” See also Davidson & Pitchal, supra note 179.


